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ATTACKS ON THE CONSTITUTION, VIOLENCE,
AND THE NECESSITY FOR DISOBEDIENCE
MORRIS D. FORKOSCH*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A TTACKS on the Constitution
began even before it was ratified by the
1

required nine States. For example, Yates and Lansing of New York
refused to sign the Constitution, with Hamilton alone so doing from that
state, and ratification there was secured only after nine others had so done.
"The Federalist" and the "Federal Farmer" 2 indicate the depth of the
opposition, and the immediate adoption of the Bill of Rights discloses
how widespread it was. One can therefore justly say that the Constitution
was assailed before its birth, during its labor pains, and ever since its first
amendments.
These assaults have been somewhat idealistic, base and ignoble, or
in between; some have been motivated by fear, others by ignorance, and
yet many by a felt concern for our way of life and government. The attacks have not been solely political, but economic, social, and religious
bases (prejudices) also have been disclosed. And while these "external"
assaults may be examined, there are also "internal" ones--i.e., within the
federal government, the three departments may so act as to assault the
Constitution.
These modern-day charges have been levelled at, for example, the
President (Lyndon B. Johnson and Franklin D. Roosevelt) and the Supreme Court (the "Warren" Court) because of their alleged flouting of
the Constitution, and current opposition to our Vietnam participation is
likewise indicative of these contentions. Assaults on the Constitution may
3
therefore be examined from several points of view.
II.

PRELIMINARY ANALYIsis

While an attack on the Constitution may take many forms, we obviously do not refer to a direct physical one, as when a person seeks to
mutilate, tear, or burn it. Nor is it suggested that we include an assault
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. Such "attacks" are discussed at notes 34-41 infra and accompanying text.
2. This work was ascribed to Richard Henry Lee, "as a sort of textbook for the opposition." X1 Dictionary of American Biography 120 (Malone ed. 1933).
3. (a) It may not be inappropriate to point out that this writer takes the position of
a devil's advocate throughout this paper; (b) further, although not separately developed,
the justification for the judiciary's role in our legislative process is not only reason, as
opposed to power, but also invitation--i.e., the Congress at times deliberately "requests"
the Supreme Court to exercise this role; (c) the preponderance of judicial "assaults" is
a reflection of the current outcries, but this is merely because, like one's nose, it is struck
first in any assault or counter-assault.
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such as the Civil War, although if decided otherwise there might be no
Constitution. With respect to what is assaulted, we may exclude a restriction to the physical document maintained at Washington, for there is
more to the Constitution than paper and ink.
The concept of our Constitution today goes beyond a written formulation of a form of government and its judicial interpretation. It may not be
incorrect to say that for many Americans, perhaps the vast majority, the
Constitution incorporates "fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law"; 4 that it means a
way of government, of life, and of protection, of imbedded folkways and
mores, of a whole congeries of historical accumulations into a religious,
political, social, and economic weltanschauung. There may be disagreement with phraseology, but, it is suggested, not with approach. Even the
Supreme Court has upheld ' a statute because it is in accordance with the
"spirit of the Constitution" and it has deliberately created a penumbral
region of First Amendment shadowland where "the Constitution is what
the judges say it is."" The Constitution has become so institutionalized
that some even claim it to be "un-American" to suggest any degree of
change or modification. From this overall point of view assaults may
therefore be alleged to occur whenever constitutionally protected interests,
vested or otherwise, are threatened. 7
Threats, and interests, take many forms;" the consequences may also
be unpredictable. But these interests or threats, and their counters, do not
then, necessarily stop; they may go further. To illustrate, we may first
refer to the early Alien' and Sedition Acts"° of 1798 which, while not
4.

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)

(Holmes, J., dissenting).

5. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966), quoting from Chief Justice
Marshall in M'Culoch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
6. Chief Justice Hughes, quoted in Hendel, Charles Evan Hughes and the Supreme Court
11 (1951). The penumbral aspect is found in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965), which is especially interesting because of the respective reference to and discussion

of the ninth amendment and its own rights of the people by Justices Douglas and Goldberg, who, with those concurring with them, total six of the current bench.
7. An example is found in the scathing dissent of Mr. Justice Campbell (joined by
Daniel and Catron, JJ.) in Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 362 (1856), where
he compared the legal situation in Turkey and Ohio, and, inter alia, concluded that "the
corporate moneyed interest is dominant in Ohio, and in either country that interest claims
exemption from the usual burdens and ordinary legislation of the State." Id. at 370.
8. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Justice Brennan said that "in the
context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences;
it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment . . . for the
members of the Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of political expression.
Groups which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts." Id. at 429.
9. 1 Stat. 570 (1798).
10. 1 Stat. 596 (1798).

1966]

ATTACKS ON THE CONSTITUTION

exactly in accord with our national principles, were (unconstitutional")
reactions, albeit with built-in limitations, and then refer to the notorious
Espionage Act of 191713 and the temporary Sedition Act of 1918.1" Even
the enunciation of the doctrine of judicial review in 1803 was not accepted
without much opposition, 5 and this is still present as an alleged threat
to modem interests.' 6 Or, to broaden the illustrations, we may refer to
late nineteenth century America where, at the behest of business advocates, the Supreme Court adopted an interpretation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment which countered threats to established
property rights. But this defense was not sufficient; new threats arose
from and because of this successful judicial counter, and these, in turn,
had to be once again judicially countered 8 until resolution of these
"interest-threat-counter" situations by legislation."
11. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (dictum).
12. See Miller, Crisis in Freedom (1951).
13. 40 Stat. 217 (1917). Title I is thoroughly discussed in Gorin v. United States, 312
U.S. 19 (1941). Of special pertinence is Title XII, prohibiting from the mails "any matter
advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United
States ...

."

18 U.S.C. § 1717(a) (1964). Although the last clause is highly questionable

on "free speech" grounds, early challenges to the section failed. Masses Publishing Co. v.
Patten, 246 Fed. 24 (2d Cir. 1917); Gitlow v. Kiely, 44 F.2d 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1930), aff'd,

49 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 648 (1931). See notes 111-12 infra. See
generally Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1941).
14. 40 Stat. 553 (1918). This 1918 amendment to the 1917 Act was later repealed. 41
Stat. 1359 (1921). Cf. note 91 infra and accompanying text.
15. This doctrine was propounded in Marbury v. Madison, 5 US. (ICranch) 137 (1803).
For a general discussion of the background of judicial review, see Burton, The Cornerstone
of Constitutional Law, 36 A.BA.J. 805 (1950). On the judicial appointments, see Turner,
The Midnight Judges, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 494 (1961). For judicial opposition, see, e.g,
Eakin v. Raub, 12 S.& R. 330 (Pa. 1825) (dissenting opinion). Presidential opposition is
exemplified by Lincoln's First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861, in Raymond, History of
the Administration of President Lincoln 112-20 (1864).
With this doctrine there necessarily blends the national supremacy under article VI, i.e.,
the nation must follow these judicial views until reversed or amended. Thus, Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), compelled the Virginia courts to bow,
"and we deliver our judgment with entire confidence," concluded Air. Justice Story, "that
it is consistent with the constitution and laws of the land." Id. at 362. Judge Roane, however, characterized a subsequent holding as "a most monstrous and unexampled decision."
1 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 555 (1926). For the latest illustration of this negative attitude, see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958).
16. For a sophisticated analysis, see Hyneman, The Supreme Court on Trial 84-89
(1963) ; cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where Mir. Justice Douglas stated:
"We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of
Estate] laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions." Id. at 482.
17. Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution (1942).
18. E.g., labor's efforts against injunctions as countered from 1895 to 1932. See generally
Forkosch, Labor Law §§ 205-16 (2d ed. 1965).
19. Ibid.
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Throughout these attacks on interests, the battle cry was constitutionality--i.e., that what actually was involved was an attack on the Constitution and its principles. Thus, in the 1930's, Roosevelt's efforts to
galvanize Congressional action were frustrated by judicial precedents
which, as just indicated, had been counters to threats to interests; but
now, instead of a legislative resolution, judicial decisions undertook to
resolve the new threats with most of the holdings not reversing, but
distinguishing the old and expanding the scope of the constitutional
clauses." Judicial counters, however, must not be thought of as limited
to the protection of property interests, with consequences as just disclosed.
The present years also illustrate judicial counters to threats against per22
2
sonal interests, whether these involve color, ' legislative apportionment,
23
or criminal law.
The cry of attack has also been raised when Presidential action occurred. For example, Jefferson allegedly violated the Constitution when
he authorized the Louisiana Purchase in 1803;24 the social and economic
revolutions under Jackson and Roosevelt were branded as unconstitutional; 25 Lincoln's unilateral call for enlistments, without immediate congressional authority, his declaration of a blockade, and his suspension of
habeas corpus 26 were likewise attacked; and today President Johnson's
20. See, e.g., Forkosch, Constitutional Law §§ 205-42 (1963) (discussion of commerce
clause).
21. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948).
22. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
23. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
24. The contention was that the American-French Convention of April 30, 1803, could
not agree to the purchase because the Constitution did not permit such incorporation of
new territory (and this was Jeffersonism). Jefferson's proposal for a constitutional amendment was dropped when Livingston wrote that Napoleon might change his mind on
selling. The purchase treaty was, therefore, ratified immediately. However, the constitutional assault was rejected in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 342 (1828),
which upheld the Spanish cession of Florida by treaty in 1819.
25. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (amended by 61
Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1964)), was hotly contested, with preliminary injunctions and obstructions preventing its initial effectuation, until its constitutionality was upheld in 1937. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(5-to-4 decision).
26. See, e.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861),
where Taney's protests were voiced, albeit in vain. Congress thereafter granted Lincoln
this power. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755. The validity of this grant was
assumed in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Lincoln's views on Supreme
Court decisions are exemplified by his comments on Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1857), in his famous debates with Douglas. He stated that "the sacredness
which Judge Douglas throws around this decision is a degree of sacredness that has never

1966]

ATTACKS ON THE CONSTITUTION

authority and conduct of affairs in Vietnam are also being castigated.'
In other words, all three departments of the federal government have
been accused of successfully defying the Constitution, and in effect this
lends an imprimatur of rationality and respectability to the attacks by
others today. However, two other questions intrude: Do these modern
assaults have a root in our past history of national violence? Do they have
a root, however slim, in anti-intellectualism?
For example, we were conceived in colonial wars with the Indians, and,
as a nation, we were born in a revolution. Our frontiers were expanded and
nurtured in violence. So also was the national destiny determined in a
Civil War, and its social and economic reforms have seen open warfare
erupting between the partisans, from the nineteenth century Pullman and
Homestead strikes to the twentieth century Kohler strike, from the nineteenth century Reconstruction and Ku Klux Klan period to the twentieth
century's era of equality and civil rights and reforms. This "national
character,"2 it is suggested, may also be the reason not only for the rising
crime rate, but, for our purposes, for the erroneous national view that
under the Constitution any governmental legislation or action may be
challenged and, despite all else, meanwhile disobeyed with impunity. To
the extent that law (and the Constitution as the fount of our fundamental
laws) suffers, then the Constitution is assaulted.
On anti-intellectualism, the Founding Fathers, steeped in the political
philosophy of the Greeks and their own contemporaries, were followed a
before [been] thrown around any other decision. . . . It is based upon falsehood in the
main as to the facts." Quoted in Myers, History of the Supreme Court of the United States
477 (1925). Even before Lincoln, this executive antagonism to judicial decisions can be
found. For example, President Jackson said "John Marshall has made his decision. Now
let him enforce iL" Morison, Oxford History of the American People 450 (1965). Franklin
Roosevelt is reputed to have been ready to defy the Court if the Gold Clause Cases of
1935 had been otherwise decided-e.g., Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 US. 240 (1935).
27. See, e.g., American Policy Vis-h-Vis Vietnam (1965) (brief prepared by Lawyers
Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam).
28. The "national character" includes many aspects of life, such as the deep-rooted
Puritan religious approach which so influenced the nation (and still does). One of these
aspects is the predilection to violence which is also found in current %WildWest literature,
comics, movies, etc., the use of the bullet to assassinate not only Presidents but also others,
the Prohibition Era when law-breaking was a way of life, and so forth. If such enumeration were continued it would appear as if the United States were a center of internal lawlessness. Yet the "national character" externally is epitomized by the Treaty with Other
Powers providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact), Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, ratified 81-1 by the Senate in 1929. This
treaty was used as a base for the Nuremberg war trials.
As opposed to this internal "national character," the non-violence today espoused by many
groups may presage a new era, and the National Conference for New Politics, just created
in the spring of 1966, may illustrate the substitution of the ballot for the bullet and violence.
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generation later by the Know Nothing Party; the Wilson-RooseveltKennedy stream found the materialism of the 1920's, the McCarthyism
of the 1950's, and the Ku Klux Klan and extremists of the 1960's close
behind. The early and late haters were and are anti-Catholic, anti-innovation, and anti-whatever would upset the past, so that minorities (religious
or other) found themselves deprived of constitutional protections, all
in the name of the Constitution, and therefore that document was attacked
in reverse fashion. American history has many illustrations in this
area, and the too-recent era of McCarthyism, as well as current extremism informs us that bigotry is still with us,29 and, sadly, the Constitution
suffers through such eroding infringements."0 There is, however, another
subtle, sophisticated and suave form of anti-intellectualism which may be
mentioned. This new approach substitutes the Supreme Court as the devil
to be exorcised, preaches upholding the Constitution, but simultaneously
tears it down by destroying an indispensable part of it and decrying the
changes in our social and political institutions without congressional participation.
The preceding may permit the conclusion that attacks on the Constitution take many forms, that interests of many kinds are involved, and
that our history and background cannot be omitted. These assaults may
come from federal and state governments, from the three federal departments, and from private persons. Further, the American temper still contains what can be described as a delight in a constitutional battle, with
the blood surging as the bugle sounds the attack.
However, many of these assaults are, in fact and in law, merely "gripes,"
and as such may here be ignored." Others likewise may be omitted where
the legislation teeters upon, but does not unquestionably plunge into, the
29. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 20, 1966, p. 41, col. 4; id., March 21, 1966, p. 24,
col. 2. These articles detail the investigation being conducted by the New Jersey Young Republican Committee concerning charges that, at its state convention in May 1965 and at
a national convention in June 1965, a "rat fink" group bad sung anti-Negro, anti-Semitic,
and anti-Catholic songs. See Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (1963).
To the extent that administrators express personal views in their unwarranted interpretations of statutes, this is also within the current stream.
30. The House Committee on Un-American Activities, formed under the authority of
60 Stat. 812 (1946), 2 U.S.C. § 72a(nt) (1964), has been denounced by many organizations. These groups claim that this Committee violates the constitutional rights of all
persons subpoenaed before it. There are, of course, two sides--e.g., the Congress has
continuously legislated funds, but the point here made is that respectable opinion exists
concerning the quoted assault on the Constitution by the Committee.
31. This is not intended to denigrate the political effectiveness of a gripe, as witness
the public clamor over Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) which resulted
in the adoption of the eleventh amendment. See 1 Warren, op. cit. supra note 15, at 91-102.
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abyss of unconstitutionality, 32 for otherwise much of government's work
might never be done. It is only when legislation or conduct is clearly and
unquestionably violative of fundamental law (i.e., the weltanschaitung
above mentioned) that such an assault occurs as is here envisaged, or
when the act creates, or conduces to, a climate which clearly flouts the
Constitution's proscriptions and rights. As difficult of ascertainment as
is the former, the latter may be more severely attacked as leading toward
"a Serbonian Bog." 33 Nevertheless, there is no other and more specific
preliminary enunciation possible. We may, however, further our tentative
understanding of the source and nature of these many attacks on the
Constitution if their conceptual bases are additionally highlighted through
an examination of cases placed in some context and, finally, one current
assault will be considered.
III. PARTICULAR ATTACKS
A four-fold division of these attacks may be made: (1) general; (2)
federal (and this into judicial, executive, and legislative); (3) state; and
(4) private. Briefly, these may be illustrated as follows.
A. In General
The Constitution was promulgated illegally. The 1787 invitation to
the states to send delegates to a convention was "for the sole and express
purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation," 3 and the subsequent
action of the convention was "in technical excess of its authority."3
Further, even ratification by the ninth state had to be reported back to
the old congress-i.e., it was revision and not substitution which was
originally desired, even though such congress thereupon resolved to commence proceedings under the new Constitution the following year." The
32. For example, these were the arguments raised in Congress against the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 20o0a. Its
application to restaurants in interstate commerce was upheld in Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964), and to motels serving interstate travelers, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Similar arguments were employed against certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, but this measure was upheld in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), with Mr. Justice Black as the sole dissenter (and then
only in part). Id. at 355 (separate opinion). In this dissent, § S of the Act, 79 Stat. 439
(1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (Supp. I, 1965), was vigorously attacked. Id. at 356.
33. This term was used in Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499
(1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
34. 3 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 14 (1911).
35. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 459 (1934) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting).
36. Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420 (1820).
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counter-argument, as phrased by James Madison, stems from "the absolute necessity of the case

....

Y;37

The Constitution was adopted by a minority of the people, even though
by a majority (ultimately all) of the states. This contention is twopronged. If the states created and adopted the Constitution, then the
federal government must look to these sovereigns for its powers, e.g., the
tenth amendment reserves
all not so delegated. But this amendment
"states but a truism,"3 and it is actually the people who gave life and
power to the new government.3 0 If this be so, then a democratic headcounting discloses that the margin of ratification (by states, with majorities in each controlling) was so small that a popular referendum would
have defeated the Constitution. ° Also, since the convention sought a twothirds vote of the states (9 of 13), then the same percentage definitely
would have meant rejection by the people, and would never have resulted
in even a proposal, i.e., of 74 representatives chosen by the 12 states
(Rhode Island excepted) only 55 gathered for the Constitutional Convention, and of these only 39 signed the document.41
Assuming the existence of the Constitution when its amending provisions were violated, the amendments so added were invalid, and, therefore, these new provisions need not be followed. This argument stems
from the requirement in article V that the amending process requires
state ratification whether by state legislatures or by state conventions,
as Congress chooses. Assuming the former, then where the legislatures
are not able freely so to determine, then the Constitution is not only
assaulted, but the alleged amendment is also invalid.42
Following close upon the preceding, and also subsumed within the next
division, is the contention that the amending process is flouted when the
judiciary "amends" through allegedly "interpreting" the Constitution. 3
37. The Federalist No. 43, at 292 (Ford ed. 1898).
38. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (Stone, J.); see United States v.
Sprague, 282 US. 716, 733 (1930).
39. M'Culoch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
40. There is nothing remarkable in this, as recent presidential elections have seen an
electoral college majority based upon a minority of the voters. On the struggle for ratification, see Morison, op. cit. supra note 26, at 312-16 (1965).
41. A bare majority of the 74 signed, although these were two-thirds of those who
gathered at Philadelphia.
42. This is the overall contention of the "conspiracy" advocates with respect to the
ratification of the fourteenth amendment. See Forkosch, Constitutional Law § 360 (1963).
There has also been a similar attack upon the eighteenth amendment, i.e., that it should
have been submitted for ratification to and by the people through state conventions and
not state legislatures.
43. The constitutional theory and justification for judicial review is that the Supreme
Court merely "finds" the law and applies it in particular cases, with interpretation of the
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Even more reprehensible, it is claimed, is the situation which occurs when
the Supreme Court interprets a constitutional amendment, and the Congress rejects a proposed amendment which would modify or overrule that
decision. If legislation is then enacted in accordance with the Court's decision, and the Court then overrules its prior decision it has, in effect,
enacted the rejected amendment and rendered the legislation unconstitutional.44 The dissents give the arguments against this procedure," but
Constitution and statutes being an essential corollary. Therefore, the Court does not "make"
law, as this is a function of the legislature. When the "make" supersedes the "find," then,
runs the argument, the judiciary has become the legislature and thereby flouts the constitutional "separation of powers" doctrine.
44. An analogous situation was Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
Mr. Justice Black dissented, id. at 670, as did Mr. Justice Harlan with whom Mr. Justice
Stewart joined. Id. at 680. The background discloses that eleven Southern states enacted
poll taxes in the post-Reconstruction period, admittedly to deny Negroes the right to vote;
seven were thereafter repealed (as was also done in Vermont). The constitutionality of
these laws was upheld in Breediove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), despite "privileges and
immunities" and "equal protection" contentions under the fourteenth amendment. The first
federal bill to outlaw poll taxes was introduced in 1939. The twenty-fourth amendment was
ratified in 1964 and invalidated the poll tax requirement for federal elections, thus overturning state laws to the contrary. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965). Congress,
in § 10 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 442, 42 U.S.C. § 1973h (Supp. 1,1965),
denounced the remaining poll taxes for state voting and, by virtue of its power under § S
of the fourteenth amendment, and § 2 of the fifteenth amendment, directed the Attorney
General to bring a declaratory judgment or injunction action against these states for the
requisite relief. Notwithstanding the references to the fourteenth amendment in Breedlove
v. Suttles, supra, a suit by Virginia residents to denounce their state's requirement under
the equal protection clause resulted in the Court's overturning these laws (and also, by
inference, the "pauper" laws which deny the franchise to these citizens), without going into
the preceding history and congressional failure to act. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 US. 528
(1965). Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, did not refer to Butler v. Thompson,
341 U.S. 937 (1951), in which the Virginia law had been upheld against his lone dissent.
45. Mr. Justice Black wrote, inter aia, that "since the Breedlove and Butler cases were
decided the Federal Constitution has not been amended in the only way it could constitutionally have been, that is, as provided in Article V of the Constitution. I would adhere
to the holding of those cases. The Court, however, overrules Breedlove in part, but its
opinion reveals that it does so not by using its limited power to interpret the original
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, but by giving that clause a new meaning which it
believes represents a better governmental policy. From this action I dissent." Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US. 663, 671-72 (1966) (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice
Harlan also dissented, stating that "the final demise of state poll taxes, already totally
proscribed by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment with respect to Federal elections and abolished by the States themselves in all but four States with respect to state elections, is
perhaps in itself not of great moment. But the fact that the coup de grace has been administered by this Court instead of being left to the affected States or to the federal
political process should be a matter of continuing concern to all interested in maintaining
the proper role of this tribunal under our scheme of government." Id. at 650; see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). It was
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the assault on the Constitution's amending provisions is here disclosed.
The counter-argument to these dissenting views is that a constitutional
right need not wait on legislative action, and that, if one clause does not
work, then another may.40
B. FederalAttacks
1. By the Judiciary
The doctrine of judicial review, or supremacy, was claimed to be
in contravention of the Constitution. It may be counter-urged that
necessity, and at least a degree of ambiguity, permitted this, and also
that Congress opened the door by inviting such a judicial rejection of
original additional jurisdiction.4 7
This question of ambiguity raises another contention. When a constitutional provision is specific, without any question able to be raised as
to meaning, then it must be followed regardless of consequences. For
example, only the President himself can perform certain acts, and even
a Wilsonian illness cannot permit change. For example under article I,
section 7, clause 2, only the President can "sign" a bill. The eleventh
amendment overcame a different, but likewise specific, judicial application
and consequence.4" But this amendment itself is "word-specific." Does
an assault not occur when the Supreme Court amends the amendment
further, and thereby eliminates the Constitution-at least for this new
purpose? 9
The concept of a continuing judicial constitutional convention, or that
the Constitution is what the judges say it is, 50 expresses another purported
further stated by Mr. Justice Harlan that "my disagreement with the present decision
is that in holding the Virginia poll tax violative of the Equal Protection Clause the Court
has departed from long-established standards governing the application of that clause."
Id. at 681. "Property and poll-tax qualifications, very simply, are not in accord with current egalitarian notions of how a modern democracy should be organized. It is of course
entirely fitting that legislatures should modify the law to reflect such changes In popular
attitudes. However, it is all wrong, in my view, for the Court to adopt the political doctrines popularly accepted at a particular moment of our history and to declare all others
to be irrational and invidious, barring them from the range of choice by reasonably minded
people acting through the political process." Id. at 686.
46. The Court rejected the first AAA because of its dependence upon the taxing and
spending clause, United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), but it upheld the second In
Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939), where the commerce clause was the base.
47. See note 15 supra. It may, however, be argued that Marshall need not have come
to this constitutional issue, but, nevertheless, seized it for its permitted assertion of his
judicial power of reviewing legislative enactments.
48. This amendment reversed the consequences of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.)
419 (1793), which permitted a citizen to sue his state on its defaulted bonds.
49. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
50. See text accompanying note 6 supra. However, this statement may involve a "novel
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judicial assault. In one sense this cannot be countered, but, it may in the
sense that this is the nature of judicial review. The people have never
expressed dissatisfaction, and, by amending the Constitution to reverse
judicial decisions, they have impliedly confirmed this assault."' Nevertheless, some of the Justices disapprove of this almost unlimited power,
feeling that it encroaches upon the legislative function, or in particular
cases is used to deny a person his constitutional rights and thereby "we
forsake a government of law and are left with government by Big
Brother."52
There is another and subsidiary aspect of this judicial instability
which involves, besides the judicial interpretation of the clauses of the
Constitution, statutes 53 and judicial principles. Stare decisis supposedly
represents stability in the application of law and not, as one Justice
objected, throwing judicial decisions "into the same class as a restricted
railroad ticket, good for this day and train only. '3 4 As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter expressed it, "ought the Court not reenforce needlessly the instabilities of our day by giving fair ground for the belief
that Law is the expression of chance-for instance, of unexpected
changes in the Court's composition and the contingencies in the choice of
successors.""5 There is, nevertheless, an antinomy between stability and
construction of the facts," Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US. 536, 587 (1965) (Clark, J, dissenting),
a "remarkable emasculation of a prohibitory statute," id. at 591 (White, J, dissenting),
or a judicial reaching into the trial record for one sentence upon which to reverse, when
this language had gone unnoticed and was not referred to "until this Court's independent
research ferreted it out of a lengthy and somewhat confused record" Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 7 (1949) (Vinson, C. J., dissenting).
51. See notes 48-49 supra; text accompanying note 105 infra. The sixteenth amendment
reversed Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
52. Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 501 (1966) (Stewart, 3, dissenting). See
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 515 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Black
stated that "distorting or stretching that Amendment by reading it as granting unreviewable power to this Court to perform the legislative function of fixing punishnents for all
state and national offenses offers a sadly inadequate solution to the multitudinous problems
generated by what I consider to be the un-American policy of censoring the thoughts and
opinions of people." Id. at 517. Similarly, Mr. justice Stewart wrote: "For me, however,
there is another aspect of the Court's opinion in this case that is even more regrettable.
Today the Court assumes the power to deny Ralph Ginzburg the protection of the First
Amendment because it disapproves of his 'sordid business.' That is a power the Court does
not possess. For the First Amendment protects us all with an even hand. It applies to
Ralph Ginzburg with no less completeness and force than to G. P. Putnam Sons. In upholding and enforcing the Bill of Rights, this Court has no power to pick or to choose.
When we lose sight of that fixed star of constitutional adjudication, we lose our way."
Ginzburg v. United States, supra at 501 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
53. See, e.g., note 50 supra.
54. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
55. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 86 (1950) (dissenting opinion). In regard
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progress or, as Pound opened a volume, "law must be stable and yet it
cannot stand still."5 6 Further, there is a distinction in this area of the
law which Lincoln early made: that constitutional decisions made in
"ordinary litigation" are binding only upon the litigants but not upon
"the policy of the government, upon vital questions affecting the whole
'5 7
people," for otherwise they "will have ceased to be their own rulers.
These, perhaps, may be the reasons why other Justices reject the
notion of stare decisis in the field of constitutional law; that is, the
doctrine has "never been a blind, inflexible rule," that it "has never been
thought to extend so far as to prevent the courts from correcting their
own errors," and that "erroneous precedents" should not be followed. 8
As another Justice has put it, the doctrine "carries different weight in
50
Constitutional adjudication than it does in nonconstitutional decision,"
and he, therefore, applied it in private litigation when "the question thus
raised is . . . of constitutional dimension." 0 Since the mass "constitu-

to the Court's composition and succession, there was the alleged court-packing so as to
overrule Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870). See generally Ratner, Was
the Supreme Court Packed by President Grant?, 50 Pol. Sci. Q. 343 (1935); Fairman,
Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court and the Legal Tender Cases, 54
Harv. L. Rev. 977, 1128 (1941). The reversal, which was sought, occurred in the Legal
Tender Cases, 79 US. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871), after Grant had appointed two new Justices
to bring the Court up to nine. The two appointees voted with the former minority of three
so as to make a new majority. See generally Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United
States 51-53 (1928).
56. Pound, Interpretations of Legal History 1 (1923).
57. Lincoln, quoted in Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln xxii (rev. ed.
1951). For additional analyses and illustrations, see Heyert v. Orange & Rockland Util.,
Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 352, 359-63, 218 N.E.2d 263, 267-70, 271 N.Y.S.2d 201, 207-10 (1966).
On July 26, 1966, the English House of Lords announced that in the future it will be
free to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so. N.Y. Times, July
27, 1966, § 1, p. 1, col. 6. While continuing to "regard the use of precedent as an Indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to Individual cases," it was nevertheless recognized "that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead
to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the development of the law." Id.
at p. 6, cols. 4-5.
58. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 195 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). The Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas joined in the dissent. One of the first major corrections of a
"century of error" is seen in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895),
although this correction of error was itself corrected by the subsequent adoption of the
sixteenth amendment.
59. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 674 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Harlan
perceived no justification for rejecting the doctrine in the Mapp decision. He felt Judicial
restraint should be exercised and concluded that judicial power, not reason, was being
applied.
60. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 537 (1962) (Harlan, J.). In this Instance,
Mr. Justice Harlan wrote for a majority of three, with two others concurring, two dissenting, and two not participating. For the differing attitudes of the justices, see the
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tional" reversals of 1937,61 the doctrine has retained its vitality, but it is

of greatly diminished importance. Its application may be said to
depend upon the whims of the Justices.

The preceding two assaults are further documented by reference to
the balancing concept--i.e., there is an "interplay of competing social-

economic interests and viewpoints, ''e 2 and the Court's problem is "to
strike a balance. ' "It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall
prevail . ...""However, continues the argument, when such juggling or
balancing is required, why should the elected policy-making body not
decide, rather than a judiciary appointed for life? Mr. Justice Holmes

superficially agreed with this, saying that
I do not conceive that [deciding] to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my

agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody
their opinions in law. It is settled [that states] . . . may regulate life in many ways

which we as legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as
this, and which equally with this interfere with the liberty to contract. ...Some
of these laws embody convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share.

Some may not.65

A counter-argument may be that all government involves a continuing
series of balancings and choices, whether internationally or domestically

on the federal level, and locally on the state level; that individuals daily
face these like problems on their own levels; and that the judiciary,
confronted by similar conflicts, does not do otherwise."0
opinions in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 383
(1963).
61. In Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944), Justice Reed cited fourteen cases
in the previous seven years where such reversals occurred. For a pre-1932 listing, see
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-411 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The period between 1932 and 1943 is discussed in Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 401
(1943).
62. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 475 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.).
63. Id. at 474.
64. Lochner v. New York, 198 US. 45, 57 (1905).
65. Id. at 75. In the Lochner case the balancing involved the state's powers versus the
person's rights under the Constitution as was the case in International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950). However, the conflicting interests may also involve the
federal and state governments-e.g., federalism. The great domestic balancing of interests
today is, of course, in the area of civil, property and human rights, with individuals and
organizations also finding that governments insert their own national or local interests
into the confict.
66. For example, the national use of zoning boards, created by legislative fiat, engages
in this. "Zoning boards of appeals are made up not of theoreticians or doctrinaire specialists
but of representative citizens doing their best to make accommodations between conflicting
community pressures." Von Kohorn v. Morrell, 9 N.Y.2d 27, 34, 172 N.E2d 287, 289, 210
N.Y.S.2d 525, 528 (1961).
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The political federalism which the Constitution embodies and encourages is being negated by the decisions of the Supreme Court. While
the Congress may initiate this breakdown, the contention here is that the
judiciary permits and even expands this assault. The illustrations cover
not only civil rights, 7 but also a state's control of liquor importation, 8
of labor relations,6" of its local fight against crime,"° and of the manner
in which the federal commerce power controls the economic heart of
a state. 1 The most recent major counter-assault was that of the
Conference of State Chief Justices in 1958, which inveighed against
the judicial preemption of state power, and in particular of state
sedition laws even though the Congress had not so intended.72 But,
as Justice Jackson pointed out in 1954, "it is a mistake to lump all
states' rights together as it is done so frequently in political discussions."7
When the Court itself creates inequalities in the application of legal
principles, then it flouts its own precept of equal justice under law. This
is illustrated by the sit-down and sit-in methods. In the former, an
employee does not physically leave his place of work to strike, but remains,
takes over the plant, thereby prevents others from doing his work, and, in
the language of Chief Justice Hughes, commits "a high-handed proceeding without shadow of legal right." 4 In the latter, a group of
individuals occupies seats at a lunch counter and refuses to leave, claiming that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination, grants
federal statutory rights, and thereby prevents application of local laws
of trespass. This sit-in method was upheld inasmuch as, although the
67. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
68. E.g., Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964); Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
69. See, e.g., Forkosch, Labor Law, §§ 272-74 (2d ed. 1965).
70. See, e.g., notes 77-82 infra and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). See generally Forkosch,
Constitutional Law, §§ 205-42 (1963). This problem is manifested in Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
72. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (6-3 decision), which sparked this
counter-assault. See Conference of Chief Justices, Report of the Committee on FederalState Relationships as Affected by Judicial Decisions 9 (1958).
73. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government 66 (1955).
He felt that "the maintenance of the constitutional equilibrium between the states and the
Federal Government .. .has brought the most vexatious questions to the Supreme Court."
Id. at 65. Interstate commerce, for example, and the federal powers thereunder, rightly belonged to the national government, id. at 67, although "considerations of a different nature
arise from interferences with states' rights under the vague and ambiguous mandate of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 68.
74. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 252 (1939). In this case, the
Court upheld the discharge of those employees who so illegally take and hold possession
of their employer's property.
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Court agreed "that the law generally condemns self-help [there was
statutory immunization of] ...nonforcible attempts to gain admittance
to or remain in establishments covered by the Act .... .'"I

The Court

thus rejects a sit-down in labor-management relations as illegal, i.e., a
taking of property without due process of law, but permits a sit-in
because a federal statute in effect permits it, even though the former
approach might well void the latter act.7
The Court's decisions encourage crimes and criminals. The finger
is pointed at the consequences of several recent decisions. The argument
in some degree concedes, or at least does not denounce, the constitutional
correctness of the holdings, but contends that pragmatic considerations
have been overlooked and that experience now dictates a change. For
example, while objection is not made to the general requirement of
counsel in criminal cases,77 the exclusion of incriminating pre-trial
75. Harem v. City of Rock Hill, 379 US. 306, 311 (1964). In effect, the Court decided
in Harm what they had earlier remanded to a state court because "an open and arguable"
question of state law was involved. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), where Mr.
justice Douglas stated that "a majority reach the merits of the issue. Why then should
a minority prevent a resolution of the differing views?" Id. at 242 (separate opinion). The
dissenters in the Harnm case advanced several reasons, but applicable here is the language
of Justices Black and White. The former commented: "The idea that Congress has power
to accomplish such a result [abate lawful state convictions prior to the act] has no precedent, so far as I know, in the nearly 200 years that Congress has been in existence. . . . I
do not understand [the act to grant] . . . persons who are unlawfully refused service
a 'right' to take the law into their own hands by sitting down and occupying the premises
for as long as they choose to stay. I think one of the chief purposes of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act was to take such disputes out of the streets and restaurants and into the courts,
which Congress has granted power to provide an adequate and orderly judicial remedy. '
379 U.S. at 318-19. (Footnote omitted.) The latter felt that "had Congress intended to
ratify massive disobedience to the law, so often attended by violence, I feel sure it would
have said so in unmistakable language. The truth is that it is only judicial rhetoric to blame
this result upon Congress. . . . Whether persons or groups should engage in nonviolent
disobedience to laws with which they disagree perhaps defies any categorical answer for
the guidance of every individual in every circumstance. But whether a court should give it
wholesale sanction is a wholly different question which calls for only one answer." Id. at 328.
For additional aspects of removal, see Georgia v. Rachel, 384 US. 780 (1966) and City
of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966). In the former the Court unanimously upheld the removal to a federal court of a state trespass prosecution, while in the latter, the
court rejected removal of a prosecution for obstructing streets in violation of local law.
The latter vote was five to four.
76. In a recent case, three parents were convicted of disorderly conduct in staging a
sit-in at a junior high school to protest racial segregation. Martin v. New York, 382 U.S.
828, denying cert. in 15 N.Y.2d 933, 207 N.E2d 197, 259 N.YS2d 152 (1965).
77. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In this case, only two states joined
Florida in opposing the prisoner's claim, while twenty-two states joined in an amicus brief
supporting it. Of course, there are many questions based upon the rule in Gideon--e.g
is there a right to counsel at a preliminary hearing where pleas are not accepted and the
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statements at a police station-4.e., custodial interrogation-because of
a lack of counsel, police warning, or an invasion of rights7 8 is denounced,
and it is contended that such a rule "is most ill-conceived and . . . seriously and unjustifiably fetters perfectly legitimate methods of criminal
law enforcement.""' Various state law enforcement officials argue against
this "judicial takeover" which has "tragically weakened" 80 law enforcement and is "destroying the nation,"'" although a counter to this is the
view that crime and its rise have their basis in our social and economic
conditions rather than in reduced police effectiveness.8 2
The Court's decisions encourage violence. The contention here is
that our legal heritage requires that parties eschew private methods of
judge decides only whether to hold the accused for the grand jury and to admit him to
bail? See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), where this question is discussed but not
decided.
78. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964). Miranda and Escobedo are to be applied prospectively only. Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966).
79. Id. at 493 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Stewart also dissented, stating that
"the Court perverts those precious constitutional guarantees, and frustrates the vital
interests of society in preserving the legitimate and proper function of honest and purposeful police investigation." Id. at 494. A discordant voice was also raised by Mr. Justice White
with whom Justices Clark and Stewart joined, saying "that [while] law enforcement will
[not] be destroyed . . .it will be crippled and its task made a great deal more difficult
. ..for unsound, unstated reasons, which can find no home in any of the provisions of the
Constitution." Id. at 499. In the Miranda case, the dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan inveighed
against "the heavy-handed and one-sided action that is so precipitously taken by the
Court in the name of fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities." 384 U.S. at 525-26. Dissenting once again, Mr. Justice White said that "equally relevant [to a criticism of the
majority's decision] is an assessment of the (new] rule's consequences measured against
community values." 384 U.S. at 537.
80. William Parker, Police Chief, Los Angeles Police Dep't, quoted in Kamisar, When
the Cops Were Not "Handcuffed," N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1965, § 6 (Magazine), p. 34.
81. Garrett Byrne, Boston Dist. Att'y, ibid. Former Police Commissioner. Michael
J. Murphy of New York City has commented that the police "are forced to fight by
Marquis of Queensberry rules while the criminals are permitted to gouge and bite." Ibid.
Address by Lewis F. Powell, Jr., President of the ABA, at the Annual Meeting, in Miami
Beach, Aug. 9, 1965.
82. See, e.g., Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren, 1965 ALI Annual Meeting, In
42 ALI Proceedings 21 (1965). "Thinking persons, and especially lawyers, know that this
is not the fact. They know that crime is inseparably connected with factors, such as
poverty, degradation, sordid social conditions, the weakening of home ties, low standards
of law enforcement, and the lack of education." Id. at 30. Lord Shawcross has stated that
children go wrong "because they aren't brought up right"; that modern mobility and
inventions indicate that "the criminal is living in a golden age"; that criminals are "becoming increasingly aware of the rules of the game" and the court procedures "have
loaded the scales too heavily" in favor of the criminal and "we are paying too-high (a]
price" for our concern that no innocent person be convicted. Interview, U.S. News and
World Report, Nov. 1, 1965, pp. 80-81.
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redress, and that, when such methods are sanctioned, these multiply into
the present conditions. The FBI's figures disclose an increase in the
physical crimes and also in the violence associated with them;s' the cities
disclose parks and sections often officially and unofficially declared
off-limits; and urban populations daily spew up demonstrations which
culminate in give-and-take melees, as witness the riots in the Watts
area of Los Angeles in 1965 and 1966.4 The governments are likewise
so infected, and this recalls the television, newspaper, and other graphic
reporting of the "marches" in the South during 1964 and 1965 with police
clubbing, electric poles, and other forms of violence culminating in
private burnings, killings, and armed conflicts. While these illustrations
may also be ascribed to the executive branch, the judiciary, it is
claimed, first gives a degree of substance by initiating 8 and continuing"0
imposed social changes which necessarily result in violence. 7 The
counter, of course, is that the Court's duty is clear, that consequences
such as these are not within its province to consider, and that the
legislature can easily and speedily overcome its decisions and effects if
and when so desired."8
The Court's decisions encourage disrespect for the law. 0 It is almost
83. The argument here includes free speech aspects, such as the increase in the publication and depiction of pornography and sex-e.g., permitting the publication of Fanny Hill
to be continued--despite the television and movie concentration upon crime and criminals,
the increase in dope addiction and the necessity for money, all of which filter down even
to children. See N.Y. Times, March 20, 1966, § 1, p. 73, col. 8, concerning charges of
juvenile delinquency against three young boys (from six to eleven) who savagely beat a
four year old girl with sticks and a hammer and set her clothing afire.
84. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 18, 1966, p. 24, col. 1. As a 1966 result, there were
two deaths, twenty injuries and forty-nine arrests, whereas in August 1965, some thirtyfive were killed and nearly one thousand injured. Another aspect of this use of violence is
connected with the disrespect for the law and the reference is to assaults on the police
and the use of clubs and rocks against them. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, January 12, 1966, p. 19,
col. 5.
85. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 US. 483 (1954).
86. E.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963), rejecting non-desegregation
of public recreational facilities because of alleged fears of violence.
87. E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Efforts to prevent educational desegregation
in Little Rock, Arkansas, which included calling out the state militia by the governor to
prevent Negroes from entering the schools, resulted in President Eisenhower's use of federal
troops. Exec. Order No. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1957).
88. The results can be reversed by statute, which method was upheld in In re Rahrer,
140 U.S. 545 (1891). This case approved the Wilson Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 313, 27 U.S.C. §
121 (1964), which was enacted to overcome Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). The
twenty-first amendment, repealing the eighteenth, was proposed and ratified in ten months.
89. What has been said previously concerning violence, see notes 83-88 supra and
accompanying text, can be repeated here. However, included here is the "minor" incidental
violence which may or may not breach a law, or which is ordinarily ignored in the course
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a truism that without public suppor 0 0 a law such as the Volstead Act
(and its underlying eighteenth amendment) must fail. The wholesale
and continued national flouting of this particular law engendered an
aura of disrespect for all law which continues into the presentY1 Instead
of preventing this continuation, so runs the argument, the Court furthers
it by decisions which hold as unconstitutional state laws proscribing the
obstruction of, or congregating in, the streets 2 and which also today
permit the seizure of private property by a sit-in 3 This disrespect 4 is
also engendered in a people who believe in a pledge of allegiance which
contains "under God," 5 where religion is removed from the schools"0
of events. For example, the anti-war demonstrators who marched on Fifth Avenue In New
York City on March 26, 1966, were heckled and verbally abused by numerous persons, who
also threw eggs and, at times, engaged in physical violence. The reports indicated some
arrests. N.Y. Times, March 27, 1966, § 1, p. 1, col. 6.
90. The lack of public support in all areas is illustrated by the great apathy disclosed In
regard to murder and other crimes leading to a task force examination under the aegis
of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. In
reverse, this is also illustrated by the example of a Bronx grocer in New York City who
went to the aid of a policeman being attacked by an angry mob, was stabbed in the back,
and was thereafter boycotted by his neighbors and lost his store. See N.Y. Times, January
17, 1966, p. 1, col. 3. He was later aided with jobs.
91. Congressman Bray has referred, during the debate in regard to the draft-card
burning amendment of 1965, 79 Stat. 586, amending 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b) (3) (1964), to
the "growing disrespect for our law and institutions." 111 Cong. Rec. 19135 (daily ed.
Aug. 10, 1965).
92. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965),
were two cases in which the Reverend Cox, a field secretary of CORE, led 2,000 students
protesting segregation, discrimination, and the arrest of fellow students, to a place near a
courthouse where they listened to a speech by him, his conviction being reversed, even as to
a charge of courthouse picketing. In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87
(1965), the Court denounced the application of a (valid) loitering statute because, after
a refusal to move when requested by a police officer, there must also be "a showing of the
accused's (continued] blocking free passage ... ." Id. at 91, quoting Middlebrooks v. City of
Birmingham, 42 Ala. App. 525, 527, 170 So. 2d 424, 426 (1964), cert. denied, 277 Ala. 700,
170 So. 2d 427 (1964). See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965).
93. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964). But cf. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
94. There are other illustrations available in fields other than those used here-e.g., the
antitrust prosecutions against the electrical industry giants, resulting in comparatively light
sentences and fines, with the costs then being deductible as business expenses, or permitting
the cost of an unsuccessful defense against a criminal prosecution for fraud by a securities
dealer likewise to be so deducted (since a constitutional right to employ a lawyer is involved).
See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
95. See Lewis v. Allen, 14 N.Y.2d 867, 200 N.E.2d 767, 252 N.Y.S.2d 80, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 923 (1964). The Lewis case upheld the dismissal of a proceeding to require
"under God" to be deleted from the pledge of allegiance to the flag, which action was
recommended by the New York State Commissioner of Education for use in the state's
public school system.
96. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
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although retained for Sunday closing of businesses. 7 The logic of a Godless state, runs the argument, sustains a decision that criminal indictments
returned by grand juries whose members have been required to affirm
a belief in God are defective. 8
The Court's decisions are re-molding our political, economic, and
social life and form of government without sanction in the Constitution.
This, of course, is the basis for many attacks on the Court for its alleged
unconstitutional usurpation of power never before exercised.00 The
illustrations include the Desegregation Case' 0 0 and others. For example,
the recent "unequal voting" decisions' have resulted in the imposition
of a federal standard of "one man, one vote," 2 with constitutional
amendments aimed at overturning these decisions being proposed. The
economic guidance of the Court goes back a century and a quarter'0 3 to
(1962); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). This latter case is quite different
factually from the former one upon which the present argument is based. A constitutional
amendment on school prayers has recently been proposed by Senator Dirksen.
97. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison v.
McGinley, 366 US. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961). Mr. Justice Stewart has commented, in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (concurring opinion), where a Seventh-day
Adventist was upheld in her claim for unemployment compensation even though rendered
unemployable by a refusal to work on a Saturday, "that the Court's approach to the
Establishment Clause has on occasion ... been not only insensitive, but positively wooden,"
id. at 414, and that "the result is that there are many situations where legitimate claims
under the Free Exercise Clause will run into head-on collision with the Court's insensitive
and sterile construction of the Establishment Clause." Ibid.
98. See Maryland v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965); cf. note 95 supra.
99. See Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Supreme Court
Review 119 (Kurland ed. 1965). It has been said that "the Justices [in two early opinions]
wrote history essentially for political reasons, that is, in an attempt to solve by judicial
intervention some major contemporary soco-political problem upon which the case at
hand could be made to bear." Id. at 126.
100. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
101. These cases began with Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186 (1962), which upheld a
federal suit challenging a state's apportionment of its legislative seats. In Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963), the Court rejected a county unit system applicable in statewide
primary elections. The principles enunciated in these cases were applied to congressonal
districting plans enacted by state legislatures. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
102. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); accord, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen.
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann,
377 U.S. 678 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 US. 633 (1964). However, Fortson v.
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), upheld Georgia's reapportionment plan.
103. In Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), the
Court rejected an interpretation of a state charter to bridge owners as a monopoly and thereby
opened up economic competition except where the exclusive grant was definite and
unambiguous-e.g., public utilities.
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its modern application, for example, in antitrust and patent litigation. 10 4
Justice Harlan's views in a dissent express this anti-Court approach:
What is done today deepens my conviction that judicial entry into this realm is
profoundly ill-advised and constitutionally impermissible. .

.

. I believe that the

vitality of our political system, on which in the last analysis all else depends, is
weakened by reliance on the judiciary for political reform; in time a complacent
body politic may result.
These decisions also cut deeply into the fabric of our federalism. What must follow
from them may eventually appear to be the product of state legislatures. Nevertheless, no thinking person can fail to recognize that the aftermath of these cases,
however desirable it may be thought in itself, will have been achieved at the cost
of a radical alteration in the relationship between the States and the Federal Government, more particularly the Federal Judiciary ...
Finally, these decisions give support to a current mistaken view of the Constitution and the constitutional function of this Court. This view, in a nutshell, is that
every major social ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional "principle,"
and that this Court should "take the lead" in promoting reform when other branches
of government fail to act. The Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon the
public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained as a judicial body, be thought of as
a general haven for reform movements. The Constitution is an instrument of government, fundamental to which is the premise that in a diffusion of governmental
authority lies the greatest promise that this Nation will realize liberty for all its
citizens. This Court, limited in function in accordance with that premise, does not
serve its high purpose when it exceeds its authority, even to satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of the political process. For when, in the name of
constitutional interpretation, the Court adds something to the Constitution that was
deliberately excluded from it, the Court in reality substitutes its view of what should
be so for the amending process. 0 5
2. By the Executive
The President cannot himself do the many things required of his
office and must, therefore, depend upon departments, officials, and aides.

Nevertheless, the responsibility is his-e.g., when his Secretary of
Commerce, acting upon an executive order, seizes private property in
peacetime, there is an assault upon all of the constitutional provisions
which safeguard private property. 0 Sometimes the President must himself act-e.g., where the Executive utilizes his pardoning power to set
free a criminal contemnor who has been imprisoned by the judiciary,
he somewhat invades the constitutional separation of powers, renders
the courts impotent to a degree, and thereby requires judicial condemna104. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) (antitrust
litigation). In regard to permitting the copying of a non-patented or copyrighted Item,
despite a state's rejection, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
105. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-25 (1964). (Emphasis in original.)
106. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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tion. 07 In other situations, 0 8 the actions of the President and his assistants may be impliedly denounced, but upheld for emergency reasons, in
what otherwise might be termed an assault on the constitutional rights of
citizens-e.g., the Japanese relocation cases"0 9 or the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus."' A few illustrations from executive departments
may be sufficient to disclose some alleged assaults on the Constitution by
subordinate officials.
a. Postmaster General
Communist political propaganda originating in a foreign country is
statutorily required to be detained by the postal authorities. As interpreted
and applied by the Postmaster General, delivery was permitted only if the
addressee requested it. This has been held to be a deprivation of the first
amendment rights of the addressee."' So, too, does such an appointed
107. In Ex parte Grossman, 267 US. 87 (1925), Mr. Chief Justice Taft, formerly a
Chief Executive himself, conceded the President's technical and constitutional power so to
do, but cautioned that its capricious use might bring impeachment.
108. Although not developed here, illustrations may be found in the Kennedy-Johnson
methods in the steel industry. The late President Kennedy was successful in bringing to
bear all of the federal government's powers to compel rescission of a price increase. The
present Chief Executive has intervened in labor negotiations to compel a settlement and,
in 1966, compelled an industry back-down on a proposed increase in prices.
109. Korematsu v. United States, 323 US. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943). In the Korematsu case, the Executive Order involved was based
upon statutory authority. See 56 Stat. 173 (1942). However, in Ex parte Endo, 323 US.
283 (1944), the detention of a concededly loyal and law-abiding citizen was denounced.
Independent of these actual exertions of Presidential power there exists a question of
threatened exercise of such power-e.g., prior to the Gold Clause Cases of 1935, President
Roosevelt was reputedly awaiting a negative decision so as to defy the Court's authority.
The Court, however, upheld the devaluating power of Congress in those cases. Norman v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935);
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
110. This, of course, refers to Lincoln's actions in 1863. The Supreme Court upheld such
a suspension in Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864), which was decided
while the war was still going on. However, the Court denounced it two years later in Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), when the war was over. In Ex parte McCardle,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), the power of Congress to repeal the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction over such a writ was sustained even while the matter was before that Court. The
emergency suspension of the writ has not been confined to the United States. The Republic
of South Africa also suspended the writ under a 1963 law to keep a lawyer confined because
of his representation of certain defendants who had been accused of sabotage. See N.Y. Times,
July 10, 1964, p. 2, col. 2.
The President's conduct, even with an international emergency as its base, may be
questionably unconstitutional-e.g., the Vietnam involvement, challenged on constitutional
grounds by a group of lawyers and professors, note 24 supra, although the counter to this
was later expressed by the American Bar Association's upholding of the President's actions.
111. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 US. 301 (1965). In this case, the Court declared
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official become a literary censor when he can bar the use of the mails to
books and writings."'
b. Attorney General
Section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 requires that
Communist organizations register with the Attorney General and give
certain information."' Although barely upheld against vigorous dissents, 1 4 it was thereafter rendered innocuous by the unavailability of an
officer to sign." 5 In effect this put the quietus upon the approximately
twenty such efforts to obtain registrations. Nevertheless, in 1966 the
Justice Department sought to compel the registration of the Du Bois
Clubs, a picayune organization of about 2,500, mostly college undergraduates, and mostly opposing governmental policy and action in Vietnam.
Insofar as, and if, this federal action to compel registration involved
reprisal, it smacked of an unconstitutional effort to suppress dissent,
unconstitutional a section which Congress had added to the Postal Code entitled "Communist
political propaganda." 39 U.S.C. § 4008 (1964). In effect all foreign unsealed material
(excluding first class mail and exempted items) which was felt to be covered by the statute
was held by the postal authorities. A notice would then be sent to the addressee asking If he
desired delivery and requiring the latter to return a reply card. The Court found that this
required return was an unreasonable limitation and an unconstitutional burden "on the unfettered exercise of the addressee's First Amendment rights." 381 U.S. at 305. A majority
of five were joined by three concurring Justices (Mr. Justice White did not participate) who
felt that "access to publications [and] . . . the right to receive publications is such a fundamental [first amendment] right." Id. at 308 (concurring opinion).
112. Such a situation has been denounced in Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146
(1946). The same conclusion was reached by Mr. Justice Brennan in Manual Enterprises,
Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (concurring opinion). For standards concerning obscenity,
see Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957). Censorship is also available to customs officials under § 305 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
46 Stat. 688, 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1964). For a background analysis and application, see
United States v. One Book Entitled "The Adventures of Father Silas," 249 F. Supp. 911
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), in which summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendant because
of governmental delay.
113. 64 Stat. 993, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 786 (1964).
114. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367

U.S. 1 (1961).
115. See Communist Party of the United States v. United States, 331 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 968 (1964), upholding the refusal of an officer to sign on the
basis of the privilege against self-incrimination. In Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965),
the Court upheld the refusal of an individual member to sign because of his privilege against
self-incrimination. Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 993,
50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964), was held unconstitutional in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500 (1964). This case was distinguished in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), which
upheld a refusal to validate a passport for travel to Cuba.
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which is otherwise valid, and thereby attacked the constitutional rights of
these persons.11 6
A question involving the constitutional prohibition against excessive
bail in the eighth amendment has been raised by former Justice Goldberg.
He writes that the abuses of our present bail system must be corrected
"here and now," and he seemingly approves the illustration that civil
rights groups are effectively prevented from demonstrating in many
southern communities because of their inability to provide a suitable "bail
warchest.""' 7. In other words, the purpose of bail-i.e., to insure a defendant's appearance at trial-is (unconstitutionally) subverted when it is
used to prevent the exercise of one's rights or to impose such cruel punishment upon one simply because he is too poor to raise bail. Federally, the
Attorney General may ease the situation, and through the fourteenth
amendment's due process or equal protection clause, the Supreme Court
may likewise ease the state action.
c. Department of State
The Passport Office of the State Department has been somewhat
chided judicially because of its use of authority not given to it to withhold
passports from citizens because of political affiliation or activity."
Nevertheless, the clerks in that office, following routine policy and procedures, later rejected by their superiors, cabled American embassies
"to keep an eye on an American professor when he goes to Europe this
fall,""' 9 and to notify the State Department "if pertinent information
were received concerning his activities." 2 0 Even where the State Depart116. The FBI, as part of the Attorney General's department, may also be mentioned.
In a speech delivered on December 14, 1965, C. D. DeLoach, Associate Director of the FBI,
"found a common denominator between criminals and extreme opponents of the Vietnam
war and advocates of civil disobedience. It is that they believe they are above the law,
he said." N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1965, p. 14, col. 1. It was further reported that "Mr. DeLoach
said that he referred to 'the lawless demonstrators, the draft card burners, the raucous
exalters of the four-letter word.' . . . 'I refer to the arrogant non-conformists, including
some so-called educators, who have mounted the platform at public gatherings to urge
"civil disobedience" and defiance of authority,' he said." Ibid.
117. See Goldberg, Foreword to Goldfarb, Ransom at ix-x (1965).
118. Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958); Kent v. Dulles, 357 US. 116 (1958).
Where a statute was involved which controlled such passport issuance and use, the State
Department's action of revocation was also rejected because of the statute's unconstitutionality. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US. 500 (1964). However, the delegation of
authority in another statute to impose area restrictions on travel was upheld. Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1 (1965).
119. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1966, p. 1, col. 5.
120. Id., p. 17, col. 2. In the cables, the individual was said to have "strong pro-Communist convictions." Apparently departmental policy dictates allowing transmission of such
information when requested by agencies charged by Congress with investigative responsibili-
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ment has authority to act-e.g., to discharge summarily an employeeit has been required to observe its own procedures established by its
own regulations.1 21
d. Other executive departments
Dismissals of employees for a variety of reasons have been denounced
-e.g., that the individual was legislatively protected as to the reasons
for such a dismissal,' 2 2 that the reviewing agency was not authorized to
dismiss, 2 ' that the executive order was not followed, 2 4 that there was
a failure to comply with the department's own regulations and procedures, 2 5 and, where an industrial security clearance of a government
contractor's employees was involved, for failing to afford the traditional
safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination. 2 ' The dismissal by
the Secretary of the Army of an inductee by other than an honorable discharge was held unauthorized where pre-induction activities were taken
into account, although Congress had not so intended. 27 The Internal
ties. Clearance, however, is first to be obtained from a departmental bureau, of which the
Passport Office is a division. Since the FBI here requested this information, the only reason
for the rebuke seems to be a failure first to obtain this clearance. The State Department
spokesman was unable to say whether the original requests would be reinstated If such
clearance were now sought. N.Y. Times, March 26, 1966, p. 11, col. 1. For the other side
of the story, see Interview with Director of the Passport Division, in The Washington Star,
March 25, 1966, p. 1, col. 6. Assuming clearance, it is suggested that this administrative
snooping is undesirable and unconstitutional. If a passport is granted, then this should end
such investigations; if the individual or the area is a risk, then congressional power may
conceivably be invoked to authorize narrow rejection or restriction under appropriate and
reasonable safeguards where an emergency situation is involved.
121. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
122. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), which involved improper summary removal by President Roosevelt of an FTC member-i.e., an administrative
body created by Congress with quasi-legislative and judicial powers-where the statute Itself
prescribed the grounds therefor, thereby resulting in an executive flouting of constitutional
and congressional safeguards. Where, however, an executive department official-i.e., postmaster first class-is involved, then such a presidential power has been upheld. Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). See also Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958),
which followed the Humphrey case as to a member of the War Claims Commission.
123. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
124. In Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956), "national security" was set forth as the
basis, but the dismissal was on loyalty grounds, and additionally no finding was made
concerning a connection between the job and the national safety.
125. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) (a Department of Interior case).
126. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). But see Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961).
127. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); see Hochman, Judicial Review of Administrative Processes in Which the President Participates, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 684 (1961); Jones,
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts to Review the Character of Military Administrative
Discharges, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 917 (1957).
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Revenue Service used wiretaps, two-way mirrors, and "bugs" in seeking
out tax evaders, but, when disclosure occurred in 1965, the Commissioner
forswore its continued use, and the President prohibited it save in
national security cases. 128 This also suggests reference to the use of the
lie detector by numerous other agencies and departments as well as by
the Army.' 29
3. By the Legislature
It is unnecessary to cite instances of legislation held to be unconstitutional. The overall argument generally castigates the Congress for
defying the Constitution. This defiance may take several forms, illustrated
by the following.
a. Bill of attainder
Despite the specific prohibition of article I, section 9, clause 3,
Congress has specified individuals for punishment.3
b. Abdication
Abdication of power, rather than unconstitutional assertion as in the
preceding illustrations, is also denounced. The point urged is that Congress, and not the President or the Supreme Court, makes the laws. When
Congress voluntarily abdicates its power-e.g., during Roosevelt's famous
100 days-or plays follow-the-leader,' 3 ' or by acquiescence does not
reject indirect assertions of a type of law-making power-e.g., by the
Supreme Court 3 2 --then our Constitution, through its system of the separation of powers, is attacked. 3
128. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1965, p. 25, col. 3.
129. Committee on Government Operations, Use of Polygraphs as "Lie Detectors" By
the Federal Government, H.R. Rep. No. 198, 89th Cong, 1st Sess. 1 (1965). Hearings by a
subcommittee continued into late 1965. This writer has disapproved use of the polygraph
judicially. See The Lie Detector and the Courts, 16 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 202 (1939).
130. E.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), where a rider to an appropriations act stipulated no salaries were to be paid to certain named persons.
131. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), suggesting that a congressional
statute be enacted to permit states to enter a proscribed area under the commerce clause.
Such action was upheld in In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891). The most recent illustrations
are found in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966), and United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966). In the Guest case, Mr. justice Brennan concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1964), which makes it a crime to conspire against the constitutionally protected rights of any
citizen, does not specifically cover action by private individuals and that "the remedy is
for Congress to write a law without this defect." 383 US. at 786 (separate opinion). In other
words, such an amendment would make it constitutional under the fourteenth amendment to
punish private persons who interfere with such constitutional rights of others to enjoy stateowned public facilities.
132. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
133. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 US. 52 (1926), where Air. Justice Brandeis
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c. Other instances
Although the Constitution gives the House the power to impeach,
and the Senate the power to try a President, the exercise of these powers
suggests a momentous occasion. When indulged in for petty politics,
then the constitutional purposes are subverted. So it was in 1868 when
President Johnson was barely acquitted, for the consensus of historians
is that this was occasioned by personalities and politics, by emotions
and vindictiveness, rather than by high principles.1 34 When so used
for partisan attacks, the Constitution and the government are attacked.
While Congress has constitutional authority to "be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members . . . punish
its Members for disorderly Behavior, and . . . expel a Member,"'0 0
this power is exercised rarely. Nevertheless, in November 1918, Victor
L. Berger, a leader of the Socialist Party, whose trial was pending for
conspiracy under the Espionage Act, was elected to Congress as a
Representative from Wisconsin. The House refused to seat him the
following spring and, although again elected in a special election that
fall, he was again refused a seat. 3 No comment is here required as to
the power of Congress so to refuse a seat, nor concerning the judicial
inability to enter this field because of the doctrine of separation of
powers and the specific quoted clauses. But when such refusal is for a
political ground which the electorate has the right to determine, it
would appear as if Congress has violated some constitutional right or
else has assaulted the Constitution.
Another argument is that federalism is compelled to be ignored or
breached. The argument here is highlighted by Mr. Justice Black's recent
dissent in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.1 7 There the other Justices
upheld the requirement that a violating state's proposed voting law
must first be federally approved, which Mr. Justice Black felt "approaches
dangerously near to wiping the States out as useful and effective units
in the government of our country. I cannot agree to any constitutional
interpretation that leads inevitably to such a result."' 38 The arguable
stated that the doctrine was adopted "not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise
of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable
friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to
save the people from autocracy." Id. at 293 (dissenting opinion). See also note 105 supra.
134. See, e.g., Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction (1931). It has been
stated that the evidence was "ludicrously insufficient" as to the conspiracy charges, and the
trial has been otherwise decried. Id. at 275.

135. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, clauses 1 and 2.
136.
because
137.
138.

Berger was convicted in December, 1918, but on appeal the Supreme Court reversed
of trial prejudice. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
383 U.S. 301, 355 (1966). See note 32 supra.
383 U.S. at 360.
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distinction between the preceding and those situations in which the
federal government induces state laws and action by grants-in-aid,'
seems to be that in the latter a national, economic failure was ameliorated
through accepted financial grants to all the states, even though on
federal conditions, whereas in the former an unsatisfactory voting situation existed locally or regionally and was corrected by federally enforced
requirements to which the states objected. Regardless, other federal
powers and statutes, which have been upheld judicially, have inexorably
turned the states into administrative subdivisions of a central government,
as witness federal
control in whole or in part over road building, housing,
40
and education.1

C. Attacks by the States
The doctrine of interposition, in effect, asserts the power of a state
to interpose its sovereignty between the federal government and the
state's citizens so as to prevent enforcement of a federal power even
though its constitutionality has been upheld.' "The conclusion is clear
that interposition is not a constitutionl doctrine.4 -It taken seriously,
it is an illegal defiance of constitutional authority."'
As the result of various pressures and fears, the local communities
and the states act in ways which discriminate against, deprive, and defeat
persons who seek to exercise their constitutional rights. It is not necessary
that reference be made to the efforts of southern governors and localities
to defeat the school enrollment of Negroes or to render ineffective
139. See, e.g., Forkosch, Labor Law §§ 30-41 (2d ed. 1965), giving many such instances
in the field of social security. Mr. Justice Cardozo once stated that one had to "draw the

line intelligently between duress and inducement," that no coercion was exercised here upon
the states and that they had made an unfettered choice to follow the federal views. Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586-90 (1937).

140. For the judicial aspect of federalism, see notes 99-105 supra and accompanying text.
On these other controls, see, e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.), which is perhaps the most comprehensive federal
legislation in this field. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 enables the Attorney General to obtain
injunctive relief against a denial of equal protection in any public facility other than a
public school or college. 78 Stat. 246, 42 U.S.C. § 2000b (1964). Title IV of that act deals
with desegregation of public education. 78 Stat. 246, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1964). Title V of the

Act deals with the rules of procedure of the Commission on Civil Rights, 78 Stat. 249, 42
U.S.C. § 1975a (1964); Title VI, with prevention of the denial of benefits because of race,
color, or national origin under any federally assisted program and with the authorizing of
each federal department and agency to effectuate this, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964) ;
and Title VII, 42 id. § 2000e, with prohibiting employers of 25 or more (affecting commerce)
from discrimination. 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). The other Titles are not
here important. See also note 32 supra.
141. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
142. Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 364 U.S. 500, 501 (1960) (per curiam), quoting
from the three-judge court below, 188 F. Supp. 916, 926 (E.D. La. 1960).
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federal laws designed to remove unconstitutional barriers. Current
demonstrations against national policy in Vietnam are entitled to constitutional protection even though a vast majority of the people agree
with the present policy. State efforts to thwart protest are illustrated by
refusals to grant permits for marches or demonstrations,1 4 8 utilizing street
ordinances improperly, 4' and otherwise seeking to intimidate persons in
the exercise of these rights.
Under the analysis of assaults by the judiciary was its encouraging of
disrespect for the law. States are no less offenders, as reference to the
New York City subway strike in January 1966 discloses. That state's
Condon-Wadlin Act 45 prohibits strikes by public employees on pain of,
inter alia, automatic dismissal, but its strictures have seldom been
invoked. The final settlement ignored this statute, thus provoking charges
that "the contempt for all law engendered by this process of nonfeasance
is heightened by the doctrine of general amnesty that has become ritual
every time an illegal strike is settled."' 4 6 A consequence was a successful
nisi prius suit to hold the settlement illegal and void,' 4' whereupon the
state legislature enacted an exception to the Condon-Wadlin Act for this
government agency. 48 This inequality was condemned, as inequalities
have also been condemned when the Supreme Court has applied its legal
and constitutional principles.
As heretofore seen, there is a history of federal legislative interference
with executive and judicial officials' 4 -e.g., by impeachment-and the
Congress is also able to determine the qualifications of its own members
and vote censure.?' 0 But these are based upon and stem from its constitutional powers. When a state acts so as to refuse to seat five duly elected
assemblymen solely because they are Socialists,"' albeit within a context
of emotional post-war fever, then constitutional rights are jeopardized,
the electorate is being punished, and the Constitution's provisions concerning free speech and political association are assaulted. In today's
143. E.g., Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D.Calif. 1965); Williams v.
Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965). In Williams, injunctive relief was granted against
the city and state so as to permit marches.
144. E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965);
cf. People v. Turner,.48 Misc. 2d 611, 265 N.Y.S.2d 841 (App. T. 1965).
145. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 108 (Supp. 1965).
146. Editorial, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1966, p. 38, col. 1.
147. Weinstein v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 49 Misc. 2d 170, 267 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Sup. Ct.
1966).
148. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 6.
149. See Dunning, op. cit. supra note 134, at 279.
150. Note 135 supra and accompanying text.
151. The New York Assembly so acted on January 7, 1920. Chamberlain, Loyalty
and Legislative Action 48-51 (1951).
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analogous emotional situation concerning opposition to our Asian policy,
this assault is being repeated in the Georgia House of Representatives.
That body voted to bar a duly elected person because he refused to
withdraw his support of a statement criticizing United States action in
Vietnam.' 52 Although the separation of powers doctrine may prevent
federal judicial interference in a state election, the Supreme Court
has already said that an individual's federally protected rights cannot
be denied by a state's various departments or agencies, whether judicial
or legislative. 3 There may be a federal right to free speech without
consequences attaching such as these; or a right under the fifteenth

amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 even though these are
related to voting and not to seating as the voters' right to vote includes the

right to select and elect without impairment by the legislature;""a or a
claim that a bill of attainder is here involved. However, in any event,

this legislative action appears to be violative of the Constitution.
D. Private Attacks
Not much analysis is required to illustrate private assaults on the
Constitution. Such conduct of individuals is even more egregious than
that of governments and agencies, for ordinarily a degree of choice is
involved. For example, many of the situations discussed heretofore
stem from initial private action; additionally, we may refer to individuals
who excoriate as "young slobs" those who demonstrate against our
Vietnam policy, and in effect suggest a stifling of free speech solely
152. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1966, p. 18, col. 1, disclosing the vote to be 184 to 12
holding the representative-elect Horace Julian Bond to be guilty of "disorderly conduct"
because he allegedly advocated violation of the draft law and gave "aid and comfort to
the enemy." A three-judge federal court ruled against Bond because his statements "could
reasonably be said to be inconsistent with and repugnant to the oath which he was required
to take." Bond v. Floyd, 251 F. Supp. 333, 345 (NJ). Ga.), motion to advance denied, 383
U.S. 956 (1966). Bond's subsequent re-election was again defeated by the Georgia legislature
when a second refusal to seat him occurred. He is running for the seat a third time. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 9, 1966, p. 30, col. 3.
By analogy to the situation in the apportionment case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), where the doctrine of political question was said to be applicable federally, but not
for states where a constitutional right was involved, the constitutional inability of the
judiciary to act where such a congressional refusal is found should not be applicable to like
state refusals for now constitutional rights must be protected. This, of course, argues for
procedural acceptance of jurisdiction; on the merits, the Bond decision seems to be somewhat
far-fetched for, logically, Senators Fulbright, Robert Kennedy, and others should now be
expelled.
153. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US. 1 (1948).
154. An example is found in Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), which
validated the free, federally-protected selection of bargaining representatives in labormanagement situations despite state laws.
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because of political differences. 5' The counter-argument is that those
who counsel others to reject or defy the law are likewise assaulting the
Constitution.'5 6 Regardless of these contentions, there is probably universal agreement that organizations of the far left or far right actually
do counsel and engage in such assaults-e.g., the Ku Klux Klan-and
that at times the disease spreads into governmental circles. 167 It must
also be stated that at times individuals seeking worthy objectives do
utilize methods which infringe on the rights of others'1 8 -e.g., labormanagement disputes, with both sides engaging in conduct which is
denounced by all branches of all governments, by the public, and even by
other like groups. 5 9

IV.

THE NECESSITY FOR CIVIL OR CRIMINAL DISOBEDIENCE

An attack on the Constitution here occurs when a person is compelled
to violate a law, even though our government of laws requires obedience,
and even though disrespect for our system and its judicial peculiarities
is thereby engendered. This concept of civil (passive) disobedience,
so prevalent today, may initially be ascribed to the violator, but, conceptually and necessarily, it may properly be laid at the feet of the one
compelling it. One illustration is the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964
which makes certain conduct unlawful, and local statutes which require
that same conduct to be engaged in. Torn between Scylla and Charybdis,
155.
See Editorial, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1965, p. 30, col. 1. This form of civil disobedience
is not new--e.g., Thoreau's refusal to pay a state poll tax as a protest against the Mexican
War, his jailing, and his subsequent Essay on Civil Disobedience, which influenced Ghandls
methods which, full circle, today influence other types of American protests.
156. The contention here is that Martin Luther King's advocacy of nonviolent civil
disobedience counsels a defiance of any law deemed unjust, and this in turn leads to lawlessness and mob rule and violence. So, too, is the condemning finger pointed at the
comments from President Johnson down concerning the 1965 demonstrations. As Senator
Robert Kennedy has said, "there is no point in telling Negroes to obey the law" when
many of them have reasons to feel that "the law is the enemy." Quoted in U.S. News &
World Report, Sept. 6, 1965, p. 100. In an address to the Tennessee Bar Association, Mr.
Justice Whittaker stated that "it seems rather clear that a large part of the current rash
and rapid spread of lawlessness in our land has been, at least, fostered and inflamed by the
preachments of self-appointed leaders of minority groups to 'obey the good laws, but to
violate the bad ones'-which, of course, simply advocates violation of the laws they do not
like, or, in other words, the taking of the law into their own hands." U.S. News & World
Report, July 5, 1965, pp. 60-63.
157. For example, the "McCarthyism" of the 1950's is continued and perpetrated today
when committees, armed with the power of subpoena and contempt, either run far afield or
use this power to harass and intimidate.
158. E.g., People v. Penn, 48 Misc. 2d 634, 265 N.Y.S.2d 155 (App. T. 1964). aff'd
mer., 16 N.Y.2d 581, 208 N.E.2d 789, 260 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 969
(1966).
159. The violence and intimidation on both sides is universally condemned. See, e.g.,
Forkosch, op. cit. supra note 139, § 269.
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what is the "violator" to do? Or, a different type of assault occurs when
a law is used to deprive a person of his rights-constitutional or statutory-with or without the availability of redress, and, even if available,
then in certain cases made contingent upon a prior deliberate violation
of the law itself. Here the same comment as has just been made may be
reasserted concerning him who compels the assault. Attacks such as
these, all compelled by administrative or judicial governmental conduct,
are perhaps well intentioned and motivated, but nevertheless subtly create
antagonism and result in counter-assaults and a continuing escalation of
all forms of assaults.
A government under law requires obedience to its laws as long as they
are not repealed or judicially repudiated' 0°-i.e., "law is the expression
of a principle of order to which men must conform in their conduct and
relations as members of society . . . .,""I Of course, a law which goes
against the grain of a vast majority and is universally condemned and
ignored, cannot be effectively enforced and results in disastrous consequences, may be an exception-e.g., the Volstead Act. But laws are
ordinarily made to be obeyed, not broken, and national and local community pressures contribute to this concept. The injunctions to render
unto Caesar, or to submit to authority, or to pay the Devil his due, indicate other such admonitions of obedience. 6 2 Other illustrations, suggested
by the judiciary, are that "one would not be justified in ignoring the
familiar red light because this was thought to be a means of social
protest,""e and the Holmesian shouting of fire in a crowded theatre.
160. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 585 (1965) (Clark, J, dissenting).
Ambassador Goldberg, who, as a Justice, wrote the opinion of the Court in the Cox cases,
however, has stated (in his present position as Ambassador to the United Nations) that,
"when the Assembly acts in derogation of the two-thirds-majority requirement, 'that action
is a complete nullity . .. it is null and void.' The United States position was based, he said,
on 'as old a principle of international law as exists,' that which holds that, if an action is
unconstitutional, no person need comply with it." N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1965, p. 3, col. 1.
Perhaps this international principle is not true, or accepted, domestically. Eg., Chicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). However, Ambassador
Goldberg speaks of a principle of law which, practically, permits one to determine which laws
are unconstitutional and which are not and therefore enables one to disobey the former.
This, of course, is a rather extreme statement of the Ambassador's views and position, but it
discloses how words may be interpreted.
161. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 140 (1927). For analyses of civil disobedience, see
Freeman, Moral Preemption Part I: The Case for the Disobedient, 17 Hastings L.J. 425 &
n.1 (1966).
162. Former President Eisenhower has stated: "And you do not have the right to violate
the law. In my opinion, the draft-card burners should be sent to jail-at least for the
[Vietnam] war's duration." Thoughts for Young Americans, in The Reader's Digest, April
1966, p. 90.

163. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US. 536, 554 (1965) (Goldberg, J.). Mr. Justice Goldberg
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There is, however, a required dichotomy when people speak of "the law"
and assert that obedience to it is a requirement for any civilized society.
The bifurcation here used is statute law not yet interpreted and finally
upheld by the judiciary, and statute law finally upheld." 4 In other
words, a "law" or statute not yet so determined may or may not be
(for our present purposes) constitutional, whereas a statute upheld as
constitutional is (for our present purposes) "the law."'01° When lumped
together, error in concept and in reasoning may occur.1 0
It is the present view that a judicially undetermined law is not automatically entitled to the same level of respect as is a judicially determined
one insofar as one has a "right" to challenge the former if not the
latter."0 7 "Obedience" to the latter is a necessity under our concept of
a civilized rule of law in a government where change is available through
regular methods, whereas "obedience" to the former does not include a
refusal to permit a challenge to the statute. However, even in this latter
case obedience-with-challenge does not necessarily include breach of
the statute; if methods for the resolution of the constitutional question
are available which do not require a breach, then these are to be availed
of. If these methods are not available and the only method for such a
resolution is a breach, then this becomes a necessary disobedience.
also gave other illustrations. 379 U.S. at 563. It has been stated that "all discriminations
that violate the Constitution and laws of the United States are redressable in our courts."
Remarks of Mr. justice Whittaker, in The Dangers of Mass Disobedience, The Reader's
Digest, Dec. 1965, p. 123. See generally id., pp. 121-24. This is not entirely acceptable,
especially in light of our analyses and is definitely incorrect if the implication is that no
disobedience can ever be countenanced.
164. Common law views are omitted which, decisionally, require no statutory support
(or may have modifications). Even these, however, may be subsumed under the non-final
aspect discussed.
165. Of course we reject the question of reversals judicially or by amendment. Examples
are found in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), which overruled Adkins
v. Children's Hospital, 261 US. 525 (1923), and the overruling of Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), by the sixteenth amendment.
166. Cardinal Cushing of Boston has stated that "we are free to disagree with the
[No one] is entitled to defy a court of law. . . . The law
law, but not to disobey it. ...
which we obey includes the final rulings of the court as well as the enactments of our
legislative bodies." N.Y. Times, March 28, 1966, p. 38, col. 6. See also note 115 supra.
167. Even here it is still possible to re-challenge a judicially-determined "good" statute
and have it now judicially declared "bad." The Virginia poll-tax statute was upheld and then
denounced. See note 44 supra. Another example is found in the Flag Salute Cases, where
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), was overruled in West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Statutes have also been denounced
and then upheld. An example of this is found in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928),
which was overruled in Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S.
236 (1941), as a result of the intervening decision in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934).
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Otherwise a possibly unconstitutional statute could never be challenged.
In any event violence must be eschewed; it is seldom, if ever, that a
statute requires violence for purposes of judicial challenge. In an opinion
reversing a state conviction under a law preventing picketing "near a
building housing a court," Mr. Justice Goldberg wrote:
We also reaffirm the repeated decisions of this Court that there is no place for
violence in a democratic society dedicated to liberty under law, and that the right
of peaceful protest does not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express
may do so at any time and at any place. There is a proper time and place for even
the most peaceful protest and a plain duty and responsibility on the part of all
citizens to obey all valid laws and regulations. 168

In effect, therefore, it is not incorrect to write, in terms of vague
generalities, that the mass of opinion is that no person may break the
law while it is on the books; that adjudications concerning the interpretation, application, and constitutionality of the law must occur within the
judicial procedures fixed by the legislature or evolved over the years by
the judiciary; and that within this framework a transgressor has no
place-i.e., he should be punished. Whether or not such a transgressor has
any other choice is ordinarily not discussed, much less acknowledged.
That is what we do here.
However, obedience to the law becomes somewhat dangerous unless
one knows what "the" law is. As referred to above, what is the conscientious citizen to do when confronted by a federal negative and a local
positive commandment as to equality in civil rights? When local custom
and local prejudice are then added to these scales, the federal negative
becomes an insuperable burden to bear, and the individual thereupon
infringes the constitutional and statutory rights of others through
forced choice and fear rather than conviction.'
This national-local
antinomy is, of course, to be distinguished from the individual's personal
views and whims, even though the preceding conflict has been resolved,
so that, despite a knowledge and understanding of "the" law, he nevertheless flouts it. The main reason for the "massive resistance" technique
of the South in regard to the Desegregation Case of 195470 and its
progeny was apparently the effort to draw a parallel to the successful
emasculation of the Volstead Act. But, the parallel was ill-drawn and
the circumstances greatly different. This wholesale assault on the Constitution may have been doomed, but without the counter-assault from
the White House down it might have succeeded.
168.
169.
rather
170.

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965).
When "conviction" enters, of course, some persons have closed their businesses
than "submit" to these laws.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 US. 483 (1954).

FORDIHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

Unfortunately, one desiring to obtain some adjudication-e.g., as to
constitutionality-cannot always find a method, procedure, or remedy
available."' For example, a federal taxpayer cannot himself sue to
contest the expenditure of public funds,' although when "called upon to
pay moneys as taxes, [he may] resist the exaction as" unconstitutional.
Neither can a competitor of the TVA itself sue for such constitutional
relief on the ground of economic competition. 7 1 Or, even when a person
has an otherwise valid right and remedy, the doctrine of "political
judicially interposed so as to prevent the case from
question" may7 be
5
being decided.'

Apart from a suit by a person himself injured, but otherwise unable
to sue, the judicial questioning of a party's "standing"' 7 0 reveals inconsistencies in application which preclude effective generalization.'" It has
171. While many other principles and illustrations thereof may be given, only three are
here of moment. See text accompanying notes 172-75 infra.
172. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). However, a municipal taxpayer may
so do, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), and eventually get the local question heard
on constitutional principles, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Compare a
refusal to permit a challenge against Bible reading in a local public school, where no
financial injury was shown, Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952), with
permission so to do, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963).
173. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 58 (1936). In this case, the Court distinguished
Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra note 172. 297 U.S. at 57-58.
174. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939). The Court stated that
there was no right to prevent competition otherwise lawful, so that the company had no
standing. Id. at 138. This reasoning may appear a trifle strained, in the context of the case.
175. See, e.g., Forkosch, Constitutional Law § 54, at 60-61 (1963), and the federalstate distinction in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). On the international scene, see
comment in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591 (1952) and the decision by the
International Court of Justice in the South West Africa cases which were decided by an
eight to seven vote. It was held that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked standing to protest South
Africa's racial practices. The dissent of Mr. Justice Jessup, however, felt that there was
a juridical aspect to this "political question."
176. Standing is not to be confused with the merits of the case, as the former may be
lacking even though on the merits a party might be successful. Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka
& S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 83-84 (1958). In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-57 (1953),
the majority opinion went into some discussion of the reasons behind this rule, saying It
was partly constitutional in origin, and partly judicial, so that in "unique situations . . .
broad constitutional policy has led the Court to proceed without regard to its usual rule."
Id. at 257.
177. Standing has been equated with justiciability. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 286-87
(1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460, 470 (1939).
The cases are overly numerous in this area. For an analysis, see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150-60 (1951) and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953). Discussing those cases upholding and denying standing would merely list factsituations and not provide any consistent thread.
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been stated that "one may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate
the constitutional rights of some third party .... The common thread
underlying both [the constitutional jurisdiction and the judicial selfrestraint] requirements is that a person cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute unless he shows that he himself is injured by its
operation."'7 8 For example, a Chicago license for a movie showing was
sought, but when the film was requested the company refused. The lower
courts felt this precluded a federal suit to require issuance and to
restrain the city from interfering with the showing, but the Supreme
Court upheld the bringing of the suit although denying the claimed
relief. 7 9 The specific attack here was on the constitutional necessity to
produce the film, and if complied with (even under protest), this contention might have become moot 8 ' even though other details of the
licensing scheme could still have been attacked. Of course, a one-day
showing, resulting in a fine of one hundred dollars, would have automatically provided injury and standing. Of even more interest is the
litigation surrounding the Connecticut birth control law.
Under this 1879 Connecticut statute, persons were forbidden to use
"any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing
conception," with violations resulting in fine or imprisonment or both."8 '
Under a separate provision accessories who violated or counselled others
to violate a law might be likewise punished.8 - Three related cases are
of interest. In the first, Dr. Tileston claimed he was prevented by this
law from giving birth control information to three patients whose lives
would be in danger by a pregnancy. He sought a declaratory judgment that
his patients would thus be deprived of their lives without due process
of law, but not alleging any infringement of his own rights or any incon178. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1953). The Court stated that it was
inapplicable there because respondent had been sued for $11,600 damages which "would
constitute a direct, pocketbook injury to her." Id. at 256.
179. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), was decided five-to-four
on the merits-i.e., upholding the licensing as a general requirement, but not the particulars
as these were not attacked.
180. In Stamler v. Willis, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1966), the appellants' brief on appeal
contained this statement: "In the past, the Committee has used, and has threatened to use
in the future, federal criminal statutes, in particular 2 US.C. § 192, to compel citizens to
disclose publicly . . . [information). Plaintiffs fear that if they decline to respond to the

Committee's questions .. .they will be prosecuted for criminal contempt. Plaintiffs also
fear that if they appear before the Committee, they will be unable to determine whether

the Committee's inquiries are pertinent to the legislative purposes, if any, of the Committee." Brief for Appellants, p. 6, Stamler v. Willis, supra.
181. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 53-32 (1958).
182.

Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 54-196 (1958).
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venience to himself. The Court rejected this attempt to attack the law
on constitutional grounds. 8 3
A decade and a half later another declaratory judgment suit was instituted by a Dr. Buxton and two of his patients (a married couple), but
attempting to close the earlier loophole. The former alleged the law
prevented him from exercising his profession-i.e., a due process infraction. The latter claimed the wife's health would be endangered unless the
doctor was able to prescribe contraceptives for them-i.e., also a due process infraction. The Court, however, rejected this second effort. 84 The
lengthy dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan, 8 ' on both procedural grounds
and on the constitutional merits, gives, as to the former, a clearer picture
of the concept of standing, and, as for the latter (with Douglas and
Stewart) unquestionably sparked the third, and finally successful,
attack on the law. As to standing, Mr. Justice Harlan pointed to the
earlier and successful prosecution against a birth control clinic 80 which
the state conceded was a test case to uphold the statute's validity and to
warn other violators of prosecution and punishment: "the very purpose
of the Nelson prosecution was to change defiance into compliance [and]
...

this purpose may have been successful.". 8 7 But even more devasta-

ing are the poignant words of Mr. Justice Douglas:
What are these people-doctor and patients-to do? Flout the law and go to
prison? Violate the law surreptitiously and hope they will not get caught? By today's
decision we leave them no other alternatives. It is not the choice they need have
under the regime of the declaratory judgment and our constitutional system, It is
not the choice worthy of a civilized society. A sick wife, a concerned husband, a conscientious doctor seek a dignified, discrete [sic], orderly answer to the critical problem
confronting them. We should not turn them away and make them flout the law and
get arrested to have their constitutional rights determined .... They are entitled to an
answer to their predicament here and now.' 88

It is at this point in time that Dr. Buxton had to make a choice-i.e.,
to accept the law and to be cowed, as Mr. Justice Harlan showed and Mr.
183. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). See text accompanying note 178 supra.
184. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). It was conceded by the plaintiffs that no state
enforcement of the statute had ever occurred against the use of contraceptives, and both
sides also agreed these were sold openly in stores and also without any prosecution ever
having been brought. Two vending-machine prosecutions for the sale of the items had been
successful, but never appealed. In 1940 a birth control clinic had been closed for the violation of the statute. Plaintiffs had a letter-opinion from the State Commissioner of Food &
Drugs that diaphragms had therapeutic and other uses, and so drug stores could fill a
physician's prescription for them.
185. Id. at 522.
186. This occurred in State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940).
187. Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497, 534 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 513 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Footnote omitted.)
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Justice Douglas cried against, or to violate the law and fight it, as the
latter suggested. The language of Holmes is apropos here, that to the
objection "that a man might find himself in prison because his honest
judgment did not anticipate that of a jury of less competent men,""' the
answer is that "the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends
on his estimating rightly . . . some matter of degree. If his judgment is

wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment [but] ...
he may incur the penalty of death."'0 0 Of course, the choice was somewhat
easier because of the views already given as to the statute's unconstitutionality, but, nevertheless, a choice had to be made.'' The choice was to
violate and be prosecuted. This time Dr. Griswold, who was the medical
director of a Planned Parenthood League, and Dr. Buxton, its executive
director, "gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married
persons [sic] as to the means of preventing conception," were prosecuted,
convicted, and fined one hundred dollars each under the accessory statute,
and now found seven Justices of the Supreme Court concurring in denouncing the law, albeit for a variety of reasons. 0 2 On the question of
standing the first Tileston case was distinguished because there was now "a
criminal conviction" under the accessory statute; and "Certainly the
accessory should have standing to assert that the offense which he is
charged with assisting is not, or cannot constitutionally be a crime."'9 3
In other words, a direct or accessory violator has standing to attack such
a law or action as unconstitutional, and without a violation the attack
would have foundered at the outset.
In Poe v. Ullman,9 the impossible situation confronting a "conscientious" citizen-i.e., one who desired not to violate any law and
yet was so compelled to do-was set forth by Mr. Justice Douglas. The
189.

Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376 (1913)

(an antitrust violation under the

Sherman Act).
190. Id. at 377.
191. If a first amendment violation had been urged, an injunction restraining a criminal prosecution might have been obtained, but, first, this was not then claimed, and,
second, it was not until 1965 that the Supreme Court so held. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965), apparently has been followed in a liberal manner by the lower
courts. E.g, Reed Enterprises v. Corcoran, 354 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1965). It might also
be that, under such a first amendment claim, Dr Buxton and the two others might have
had standing to sue on behalf of others. See Dombrowsk v. Pfister, supra.
192. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479 (1965). Mr. Justice Douglas wrote for
himself and Mr. Justice Clark, although Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion, which
was joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan stated that "I join in its opinion
and judgment" of Mr. Justice Douglas. Id. at 486. Thus MAir. Justice Douglas spoke for
five justices. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the holding, but was "unable to join the
Court's opinion." Id. at 499.
193. Id. at 481.

194.

367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961).
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Supreme Court permits this citizen to escape between the horns of the
dilemma where first amendment rights are claimed, in effect creating
an exception. "If the rule were otherwise, the contours of regulation
would have to be hammered out case by case-and tested only by those
hardy enough to risk criminal prosecution to determine the proper scope of
regulation."' 95
But this rule presupposes that all civil rights are within the protection
of the first amendment; this is not so. For example, has one a right to
ride in the front of a bus? On December 1, 1955, Mrs. Rosa Parks, a
Negro seamstress, said she had such a right and refused to move to the
rear in a Montgomery bus; the Freedom Movement began from this
small incident. How else can these local assaults on one's constitutional
rights be brought to the fore save by disobedience, individual or organized, local or national, but sans physical violence and like illegalities? 9 '
Or, to illustrate local requirements concerning, inter alia, personal identification and jaywalking, if a person desires to test each such law, how
else can it be done save by refusing to identify one's self in the first situation and deliberately violating the ordinance in the second? 1 7 Again,
to illustrate another local situation, a pacifist seeks to test an "alert"
ordinance-i.e., periodically sirens and civil defense methods are tested,
and civilians must perform certain acts. How can a judicial determination as to the constitutionality of this law be obtained save by deliberately
violating it and thereby coming within court-imposed requirements of
"case" and "standing."
The 1965 amendment to the Universal Military Training and Service
Act of 19511 makes it a crime if a person or a selective service registrant
"knowingly destroys, [or] knowingly mutilates" another's or his own
draft card.' 99 The American Civil Liberties Union believes this amendment to be an infringement upon one's constitutional rights-e.g., a tear195. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487. See also the recommendation by the
United States Civil Rights Commission, in its Report released November 13, 1965, when It
suggested amendment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to permit injunctive relief against state prosecutions brought to prevent persons from exercising first amendment rights. See also note 187
supra.

196.

Of course when a valid law in regard to traffic infractions or disorderly conduct

is deliberately violated, or a sit-in results in a breach of a proper law, then the mere fact
that a civil rights claim is involved is ordinarily no defense. See, e.g., note 75 supra.
197. See, e.g., People v. Grant, 16 N.Y.2d 722, 209 N.E.2d 723, 262 N.Y.S.2d 106
(1965), which upheld a jaywalking law providing for one's arrest unless proper Identification was given, with the validity of the arrest being held immaterial where an information was filed and defendant appeared.
198. 79 Stat. 586, amending 65 Stat. 75, So U.S.C. App. § 462(b)(3) (Supp. I, 1965).
199. Ibid.
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ing or burning of one's draft card equates with symbolic free speech,"00
and some registrants agree. The question here is how to get this belief
tested in the court and the problem of constitutionality finally resolved.
Without detailing the possible methods-e.g., an action for a declaratory
judgment20 1 and/or injunction-it suffices to state the conclusion, namely,
that no practicable and judicially acceptable method exists save, as
with the Griswold case, to deliberately violate the amendment's
proscriptions. °2
In the area of labor-management relations, the ordinary method used
to obtain judiical review of a representation determination by the NLRB
is the deliberate violation of an applicable provision of the law by the
labor practice
entrepreneur or the union. Judicial review of this2 0unfair
3
brings up for review the prior representation ruling.
V.

CONCLUSION

Attacks on the "Constitution" today, as yesterday, not only continue
but also take many forms. The judiciary may bear the brunt of this
criticism because of its alleged "activism," and the far-out charges levelled at the Justices of the Supreme Court may include treason and
senility, but, withal, the very great majority of the people are content
with the present system, if not with some of its results. The Presidency
is not protected from like barbs of violating and assaulting the Constitution, nor is the Congress, and the shrill cries against administrative conduct sometimes hit the mark.
There is, however, a counter-assault, or even a counter-counter-assault,
on the Constitution, which its proponents claim is for the purpose of protecting the Constitution from those assaulting it and, therefore, is
claimed to be immune from charges of assaulting the Constitution. In
other words, and solely to illustrate, the charge is that the Communist
Party, its members and sympathizers seek to destroy our government,
and do thereby assault the Constitution even though claiming protection
under it. The Ku Klux Klan is now prepared to protect the Constitution
200. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
201. This method for resolving civil disputes is not ordinarily used for criminal matters.
Its use for our purposes is sharply circumscribed. It is also used administratively--eg,
in NLRB matters, to obtain prior Board views concerning jurisdiction on specific matters.
Some parallel method conceivably should be available in situations here discussed, but then
a question of "advisory opinion" jurisdiction might enter. This brings the problem again
into the area of necessary disobedience.
202. Lt. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, head of the Selective Service System, has announced
and upheld a policy of reclassifying from 2-S to 1-A students who stage sit-ins at local
boards. As a matter of administrative power, this is highly questionable.
203. See cases and discussion in Forkosch, Labor Law § 341 (2d ed. 1965).
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and our form of government by attacking the Communists, although in
this process there may necessarily be involved methods which might otherwise be said to violate the constitutional protections of these persons.
This counter-attack degenerates into a counter-assault on the Constitution through a denial of its protecting mantle regardless of who seeks it
or why. These counter-assaulters have a long history of effort, success,
and defeat-e.g., the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the McCarthy era
of the 1950's, and the present-day efforts of such divergent groups as
the American Legion and the White Knights (of the Ku Klux Klan). As
to these last two, it seems incredible that they can be so linked, and yet,
if one judges by methods or consequences in this area, the connection
is plain.
There is no absolute in life, save this absolute itself, and there is no
principle or rule of law or conduct which requires obedience under any
and all circumstances. Nuremberg solved this problem on the international scene for one type of a dilemma; disobedience, under narrow
conditions and circumstances, solves the instant problem on the domestic
scene for this type of constitutional dilemma.2 "'
204. The domestic scene offers instances of law-breakers asserting that the violation Is
necessitated by conscience-i.e., to do otherwise and obey the law goes against their
principles and conscience. This is found in many draft-card burning situations. However,
the facts, circumstances, law, and principles, are not the same, and the analogy Is too
far-fetched to permit domestic application of Nuremberg principles and should not be
held applicable. These Nuremburg claims were used by a draft protester who refused to
report for induction and was sentenced to a five-year term. N.Y. Times, April 2, 1966,
p. 2, col. 4.

